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BAIL – SEARCHES AND SEIZURES:  PRE-TRIAL RELEASE 
CONDITIONS IMPOSED UNDER NORTH DAKOTA 
RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 46(a)(2)(M) 
REQUIRE EXPLICIT FINDINGS 
State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, 809 N.W.2d 309 
ABSTRACT 
 
In State v. Hayes, the North Dakota Supreme Court held a district court 
abuses its discretion when it imposes a pretrial release condition on a 
defendant requiring her to submit to warrantless searches and seizures of 
her person, vehicle, and home under North Dakota Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 46(a)(2)(M), without first finding those conditions were 
necessary.  In addition, the court held when a person is left between the 
choice of violating his or her bail conditions or consenting to a search, the 
person is unable to consent without coercion.  Finally, the court held the 
good faith exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to the 
officer’s enforcement of the bond order signed by the district court.  The 
decision in Hayes will significantly affect pretrial release in North Dakota, 
because district courts will no longer be able to impose any pretrial release 
conditions under Rule 46(a)(2)(M) without an explicit finding of their 
appropriateness in a neutral and detached manner. 
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I. FACTS 
On December 1, 2008, Divide County Sheriff’s Deputy Rob Melby 
initiated a traffic stop on Anna Hayes.1  Deputy Melby testified he stopped 
Hayes because he recognized her as she was driving, and he was aware that 
she was on the Divide County Sheriff Department’s monthly list of 
suspended drivers.2  Deputy Melby arrested Hayes for driving with a 
suspended driver’s license.3 
When Hayes was searched subsequent to her arrest, the officer found 
marijuana and six hundred dollars in cash on her person.4  Another $2133 in 
cash was also found inside of Hayes’ purse.5  The State charged Hayes with 
driving with a suspended license and possession of a controlled substance 
while driving a motor vehicle.6  Hayes had an initial appearance on 
December 10, 2008, where the State requested a cash bond.7  The State also 
requested the bond order require Hayes to submit to random drug testing as 
well as warrantless searches of her person, vehicle, and home.8  The district 
court granted the State’s entire request, and asserted the random drug 
testing was a standard bond requirement for a person charged with a drug 
violation.9  The district court gave no explanation as to why it ordered the 
warrantless search requirement.10 
Immediately after the bond conditions were imposed by the district 
court, law enforcement officers confronted Hayes outside of the courtroom 
and asked for her to consent to a search of her home.11  Hayes was informed 
she could either consent to the search or risk violating her bond 
conditions.12  Faced with this Hobson’s choice, Hayes consented.13  Officers 
searched the address listed on Hayes’ driver’s license and found various 
items of drug paraphernalia.14  There was a dispute about whether the 
 
1. State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 2, 809 N.W.2d 309, 312. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. ¶ 3. 
5. Id. 
6. Id.  Driving with a suspended license is a class B misdemeanor.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-
06-42 (2008).  Possession of a controlled substance while driving a motor vehicle is a class A 
misdemeanor.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(1) (Supp. 2011). 




11. Id. ¶ 4. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. ¶ 5-6, 809 N.W.2d at 313. 
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address listed on Hayes’ driver’s license was her residence.15  During the 
search, Hayes was given a Miranda16 warning, admitted to using 
methamphetamine roughly two days prior to the search,17 and stated she 
would test positive for marijuana use.18  As a result of the search, the State 
brought four new charges against Hayes:  two each for drug paraphernalia 
possession and two for ingesting a controlled substance relating to 
methamphetamine and marijuana.19 
Before trial, Hayes moved to suppress all evidence seized during the 
warrantless search conducted after her initial appearance for the driving 
under suspension violation.20  Hayes argued the search violated her Fourth 
Amendment rights, but the district court disagreed and denied her motion.21  
A jury found Hayes guilty of all six charges.22  On appeal, only the four 
charges that were brought subsequent to the warrantless search of Hayes’ 
home were at issue.23 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
There are many aspects of the American legal system that are 
considered fundamental.  Arguably, most fundamental is the concept that 
people are innocent until proven guilty.24  From this philosophy emerged 
the concept of bail.25  Bail was said to be formed from the presumption of 
innocence rooted in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause,26 which 
required defendants charged with noncapital crimes be released on bail, 
 
15. Id. ¶ 4, 809 N.W.2d at 312-13. 
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
17. Hayes, ¶ 6, 809 N.W.2d at 313. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. ¶ 7; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.4-03 (2009) (prohibiting possession of drug 
paraphernalia); id. § 19-03.1-22 (prohibiting ingestion of scheduled drugs without a prescription). 
20. Hayes, ¶ 8, 809 N.W.2d at 313. 
21. Id. 
22. Id.  The six charges consisted of:  the two charges originally filed against Hayes – driving 
with a suspended license and possession of a controlled substance while driving a motor vehicle – 
and the four charges filed subsequent to the search of Hayes’ home.  See id. ¶¶ 3, 7, 809 N.W.2d 
at 312-13. 
23. See id. ¶ 13, 809 N.W.2d at 314.  Hayes’ appeal was centered upon the district court’s 
denial of her motion to suppress the evidence discovered at her home during the warrantless 
search.  Id.  Since the two original charges were not founded on that evidence, the court affirmed 
the two convictions that arose from her original arrest on December 1, 2008.  Id. 
24. See Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 
727 (2011); see also Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there 
is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and 
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”). 
25. See Baradaran, supra note 24, at 731. 
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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since a determination of guilt could not occur until trial.27  Understanding 
the statutory limitations that have now been imposed on granting a criminal 
defendant bail in North Dakota requires a brief review of the rules 
governing bail in this state. 
Section A will briefly discuss the North Dakota constitutional 
requirement for bail.  Section B will discuss North Dakota Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 46.  Finally, Section C will briefly discuss the Bail Reform Acts 
of 1966 and 1984. 
A. NORTH DAKOTA CONSTITUTIONAL BAIL REQUIREMENT 
In the State of North Dakota, “[a]ll persons shall be bailable by 
sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or 
the presumption great.  Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted.”28  By 
adopting this approach to bail in its constitution, North Dakota joins 
twenty-two other states29 that are considered to have a “traditional” 
constitutional bail provision.30  The “traditional” bail provision is one that 
expressly grants a right to bail, with capital charges being the only narrow 
exception to this right.31 
The fact North Dakota chose to make bail a right of its citizens, unless 
they are charged with a capital offense, while the United States Constitution 
did not,32 demonstrates the state’s preference for pretrial release.33  This 
belief was demonstrated shortly after the North Dakota Constitution was 
 
27. See Baradaran, supra note 24, at 731. 
28. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
29. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 12.3(b), at 48 (3d ed. 2007); see 
also ALA. CONST. art. I, § 16; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 8; CONN. 
CONST. art. I, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 12; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6; IND. CONST. art. I, § 17; 
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN. CONST. § 9; KY. CONST. § 16; ME. CONST. art. I, § 10; MINN. 
CONST. art. I, § 6; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 21; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 7, 
N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 11; OR. CONST. art. I, § 14; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 8; 
TENN. CONST. art. II, § 15; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 20; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14. 
30. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29, § 12.3(b), at 48. 
31. Id. 
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating only that “excessive bail shall not be required,” not that 
bail was a guaranteed right). 
33. States may seek to demonstrate their own power in construing their laws their own way, 
even when a federal version of those laws already exists.  This is commonly referred to as “new 
federalism.”  What is New Federalism?, THE LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/new-
federalism/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).  “[W]hile a State is free as a matter of its own law to 
impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon 
federal constitutional standards, it may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal 
constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them.”  Arkansas v. 
Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (citations omitted). 
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adopted in In re West,34 in which the North Dakota Supreme Court held bail 
was not guaranteed to defendant’s charged in capital crimes, although it 
could still be granted using judicial discretion.35  The preference for release 
in North Dakota has continued to be present in the courts36 as well as the 
North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.37 
B. NORTH DAKOTA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 46 
North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 46, which governs a 
defendant’s release from custody, is modeled after its federal counterpart, 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46.38  The Federal Rule was adopted in 
1944 and required courts to consider several factors when determining bail; 
namely, “the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of 
the evidence against him, the financial ability of the defendant to give bail 
and the character of the defendant.”39  While some scholars argue the 
opportunity for bail in the federal system is waning as the percentage of 
defendants being held before trial is significantly increasing,40 that does not 
mean North Dakota is following suit.41  Rule 46 is still interpreted to state a 
clear preference for the unconditional release of accused persons in North 
Dakota – either based on their own recognizance or an unsecured bond that 
is meant to reasonably assure their appearance at trial.42 
Since Rule 46 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure 
mirrors Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46, it has subsequently been 
amended following the Federal Bail Reform Acts of 1966 and 1984.43 
Although, notwithstanding one exception for persons charged with 
controlled substance offenses, these amendments have not changed what 
conditions can be imposed on a recipient of bail in North Dakota.44 
 
34. 88 N.W. 88 (N.D. 1901). 
35. In re West, 88 N.W. at 90.  While bail was not granted in this case due to the particular 
circumstances surrounding the crime, it was still held that bail could be granted in capital cases in 
North Dakota.  Id. 
36. See City of Fargo v. Stutlien, 505 N.W.2d 738, 743 (N.D. 1993) (holding a court rule 
providing minimum periods of detention before arrestees are granted pretrial release was 
unlawful). 
37. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
38. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46 cmt. 
39. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 n.3 (1951). 
40. See Baradaran, supra note 24, at 752. 
41. See supra Part II.A. 
42. State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 20, 809 N.W.2d 309, 316. 
43. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46 cmt. 
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-46 (2009).  This statute mandates that courts impose an 
additional condition of release or bail on an individual who has been arrested upon a felony drug 
violation, that they not use any controlled substances without a valid prescription from a licensed 
medical practitioner and, that they submit to random drug testing while they are out on bail.  Id. 
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C. THE BAIL REFORM ACTS 
There have been two major federal Bail Reform Acts – one in 196645 
and one in 1984.46  The Bail Reform Act of 1966 was a result of concern 
about excessive pretrial detention of defendants.47  The Bail Reform Act of 
1984 was largely enacted in order to ensure potentially dangerous 
defendants would be prevented from being released into the public prior to 
trial.48 
1. Bail Reform Act of 1966 
Congress stated the purpose of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 (1966 Act) 
was “to revise the practices relating to bail to assure that all persons, 
regardless of their financial status,49 shall not needlessly be detained 
pending their appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal, 
when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest.”50  
This statement of legislative purpose was widely interpreted to mean the 
1966 Act preferred the release of accused persons.51  Not only was it 
believed the 1966 Act preferred release, it was also interpreted to mean that 
conditions of release should only be imposed if absolutely necessary.52  
Further, the hearings held by Congress relating to the 1966 Act 
demonstrated its philosophy that conditions of release were only necessary 
if they were needed to ensure the defendants’ appearance in court.53  The 
United States Supreme Court had also previously handed down key 
 
45. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214. 
46. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976. 
47. Baradaran, supra note 24, at 739. 
48. Id. at 747-48. 
49. See John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention:  A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (1985) (stating the Bail Reform Act of 1966 was “aimed 
principally at eliminating the use of inappropriate pretrial detention, especially among poor 
defendants held in crowded urban jails”). 
50. Paul G. Reiter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Provisions of Federal Bail 
Reform Act of 1966 (18 U.S.C.A. § 3146, 3147) Governing Pretrial Release or Bail of Persons 
Charged with Noncapital Offense, 8 A.L.R. FED. 586, 598 (1971). 
51. See United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Bail should be denied 
under the Bail Reform Act [of 1966] only as a matter of last resort.”); United States v. Schiavo, 
587 F.2d 532, 533 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding the standards of the 1966 Bail Reform Act have a 
“presumption in favor of releasability”); United States v. Honeyman, 470 F.2d 473, 474 (9th Cir. 
1972) (“The whole spirit of the Bail Reform Act [of 1966] . . . is that a defendant facing trial 
should be released, rather than detained, unless there are strong reasons for not releasing him.”). 
52. Wood v. United States, 391 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“The Bail Reform Act [of 
1966] creates a strong policy in favor of release on personal recognizance, and it is only if such a 
release would not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required that other conditions 
of release may be imposed.”). 
53. Baradaran, supra note 24, at 739. 
          
502 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:495 
decisions regarding the purpose of bail – one of which was Stack v. Boyle.54  
In Stack, the Court stated the function of bail was limited, and the fixing of 
bail for any defendant “must be based upon standards relevant to the 
purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.”55  Thus, the 1966 Act 
seemed to codify both public sentiment56 as well as prior Supreme Court 
decisions. 
2. Bail Reform Act of 1984 
The call for a second bail reform emerged after legislatures were 
scrutinizing bail practices during the 1980s due to the public’s heightened 
fear of crime that began in the mid-1970s.57  The basis for the change of 
ideology was based upon the belief that: 
[T]here is a small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous 
defendants as to whom neither the imposition of stringent release 
conditions nor the prospect of revocation of release can reasonably 
assure the safety of the community or other persons.  It is with 
respect to this limited group of offenders that the courts must be 
given the power to deny release pending trial.58 
This belief prompted many to feel the 1966 Act had several shortcomings 
that needed to be rectified.59  One of the main changes to bail laws 
following the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (1984 Act) was the implementation 
of vague references to “danger.”60  Following the 1984 Act, “danger” 
references are now found in three separate contexts in bail laws across the 
country:  “(1) provisions excluding particular categories of defendants from 
the right to bail and/or pretrial release;61 (2) provisions discussing 
‘conditions of release’; and (3) provisions discussing the factors to be 
weighed by judges in fixing bail or other conditions of release.”62  While 
North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 46 was originally adapted from 
the 1966 Act,63 in 1995, it was amended to closely follow the 1984 Act.64 
 
54. 342 U.S. 1 (1951). 
55. Stack, 342 U.S. at 4. 
56. Goldkamp, supra note 49, at 3-4. 
57. Id. at 1. 
58. Id. at 1-2 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6-7 (1983)). 
59. Id. at 2. 
60. Baradaran, supra note 24, at 748-49. 
61. The fact that “dangerousness” was now allowed to help determine whether bail would be 
granted was quickly challenged and upheld by the United States Supreme Court.  United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (holding the authorization of pretrial detention based on future 
dangerousness does not violate due process). 
62. Goldkamp, supra note 49, at 19. 
63. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46 cmt. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
In State v. Hayes,65 Justice Sandstrom wrote the opinion of the court, 
holding:  (1) it is an abuse of discretion to require a pretrial defendant to 
consent to warrantless searches of her person, vehicle, and residence as a 
condition of her bail; (2) Hayes did not voluntarily consent to the search 
due to duress; and (3) the good faith exception to the warrant requirement 
did not apply regard to the bond order issued by the district court.66  Due to 
the lack of specific findings issued when the pretrial release conditions were 
imposed on Hayes, the court reversed the four convictions that had resulted 
from the warrantless search of Hayes’ home.67 
A. WARRANTLESS SEARCH REQUIREMENT 
The question of whether a defendant could be forced to consent to 
warrantless searches as a condition of bail was an issue of first impression 
in North Dakota.68  When deciding the issue, the court first considered 
whether the constitutionality of the pretrial release condition needed to be 
decided.69  The court then looked to North Dakota Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 46 to determine if the pretrial condition was allowed under North 
Dakota law.70  Finally, the court looked to a Ninth Circuit case, United 
States v. Scott,71 to help determine if special findings should be required 
before the imposition of bail conditions that are not specifically enumerated 
under the North Dakota rule.72 
1. Deciding Constitutional Issues 
Hayes’ argument in her original motion to suppress was based on 
constitutional issues.73  Hayes argued the bond condition requiring her to 
submit to warrantless searches of her person, vehicle, and residence violated 
her Fourth Amendment rights.74  However, the court noted its preference is 
 
64. Id.  The purpose of the 1995 Amendments were “to make the safety of any other person 
or the community a relevant consideration when determining which conditions of release will 
reasonably assure the appearance of a person charged with an offense.”  Id. 
65. 2012 ND 9, 809 N.W.2d 309. 
66. Hayes, ¶ 15, 809 N.W.2d at 315.  There was also a holding relating to a preliminary 
matter stating Defendant had standing to contest the search of her alleged residence.  Id. 
67. Id. ¶ 44, 809 N.W.2d at 322. 
68. Id. ¶ 16, 809 N.W.2d at 315. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. ¶ 20, 809 N.W.2d at 316. 
71. 450 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2005). 
72. Hayes, ¶¶ 25-26, 809 N.W.2d at 318. 
73. Id. ¶ 8, 809 N.W.2d at 313. 
74. Id. 
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to “refrain from deciding constitutional questions if [we] can decide a 
dispute on other grounds.”75  This preference led the court to shift its 
analysis towards existing North Dakota law. 
2. North Dakota Law 
The court first noted the state constitution guarantees the right to bail 
unless the person is charged with a capital offense.76  This right is bolstered 
by the fact that “[a]n accused released on pretrial bail has not been tried and 
is presumed innocent.”77  Hayes was using this “presumed innocent” 
argument to show she should not have been required to consent to 
warrantless searches because she did not have the same lowered expectation 
of privacy as a person on probation.78  The court stated Hayes’ argument 
raised issues regarding “the conditions for pretrial release of an accused 
under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a).”79 
Following traditional methods of analysis, the court first looked at the 
plain language of the statute.80  After looking at the language, the court 
found North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a)(1) “establishes a 
clear preference for the unconditional release of accused persons on their 
own personal recognizance or on an unsecured appearance bond to 
reasonably assure their appearance at trial.”81  However, the court noted 
North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a)(2) grants magistrates the 
power to impose release conditions either in addition to or in lieu of the 
methods of release that are given in Rule 46(a)(1).82  The court inferred the 
language of the rule requires the conditions be related to the goal of 
reasonably assuring an accused will appear at trial.83  The court also noted 
the rule lists twelve specific conditions that could be imposed for pretrial 
release as well as one “catch-all” provision.84 
While the district court did not specifically state which release 
condition listed under Rule 46(a)(2) allowed for warrantless searches, the 
court concluded it could only have been imposed under Rule 46(a)(2)(M) 
 
75. Id. ¶ 16, 809 N.W.2d at 315 (quoting Little v. Graff, 507 N.W.2d 55, 59 (N.D. 1993)); 
see Minot Daily News v. Holum, 380 N.W.2d 347, 350 (N.D. 1986); Bismarck Pub. Sch. v. 
Walker, 370 N.W.2d 565, 566 (N.D. 1985); In re Goodwin, 366 N.W.2d 809, 814 (N.D. 1985). 
76. Hayes, ¶ 17, 809 N.W.2d at 315 (citing N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11). 
77. Id. ¶ 18. 
78. Id. ¶¶ 19-20, 809 N.W.2d at 316. 
79. Id. ¶ 20. 
80. See N. X-Ray Co. v. State ex rel. Hanson, 542 N.W.2d 733, 735 (N.D. 1996). 
81. Hayes, ¶ 20, 809 N.W.2d at 316. 
82. Id. ¶ 21. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. ¶¶ 21, 22, 809 N.W.2d at 316-17. 
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since it was not explicitly listed in any of the previous twelve provisions.85  
The court then focused on North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 
46(a)(3), which states there are “seven factors that a magistrate ‘must 
consider’ when imposing pretrial release conditions to reasonably assure the 
appearance of an accused at trial.”86 
Citing In re York,87 a California case, the court noted other jurisdictions 
allow consent to warrantless searches and seizures to be implemented as a 
pretrial release condition.88  However, those conditions “must be supported 
by probable cause and be justified by the totality of the circumstances 
because of Fourth Amendment reasonableness and the presumption of 
innocence enjoyed by an accused.”89  The court’s choice to look toward 
outside jurisdictions’ interpretations of similar provisions is harmonious 
with its previous methods of analysis.90 
The court found In re York persuasive.91  As persuasive authority, the 
obligation of the district court was to inquire about the release conditions 
requested by the state, and their relevancy to assuring an accused person’s 
appearance at trial.92  That persuasiveness, combined with the requirement 
under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a)(3) to consider certain 
factors before imposing pretrial release conditions, led the court to its 
ultimate holding regarding the requirement of special findings.93 
3. United States v. Scott and the Requirement of 
 Special Findings 
Because this was a case of first impression in North Dakota, Hayes’ 
argument relied heavily on United States v. Scott,94 a case out of the Ninth 
 
85. Id. ¶ 22, 809 N.W.2d at 317. 
86. Id. ¶ 23 (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46(a)(3)).  The seven factors to be considered are: 
(A) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (B) the weight of the 
evidence against the person; (C) the person’s family ties, employment, financial 
resources, character and mental condition; (D) the length of the person’s residence in 
the community; (E) the person’s record of convictions; (F) the person’s record of 
appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear 
voluntarily at court proceedings; and (G) the nature and seriousness of the danger to 
any person or the community posed by the person’s release. 
N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46(a)(3). 
87. 892 P.2d 804 (1995). 
88. Hayes, ¶ 25, 809 N.W.2d at 318. 
89. Id. 
90. See City of Fargo v. Levine, 2008 ND 64, ¶ 7, 747 N.W.2d 130, 133; State v. Ensminger, 
542 N.W.2d 722, 723 (N.D. 1996). 
91. Hayes, ¶ 26, 809 N.W.2d at 318. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. 450 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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Circuit.  The Scott court held warrantless searches which were imposed as a 
pretrial release condition required a showing of probable cause – even if the 
accused had signed a consent form.95  The court agreed with Hayes’ that 
Scott was persuasive and frequently referred to that decision in its 
analysis.96 
Following the analysis laid out in Scott, the court looked to the record 
to determine whether evidence or testimony at Hayes’ initial appearance 
was offered to show that it was likely she would not appear at trial without 
the imposition of the warrantless search conditions.97  The court noted 
“[t]he state ‘cannot short-circuit the process by claiming that the arrest itself 
is sufficient to establish that the warrantless search conditions are 
required.’”98  While the State argued the conditions put upon Hayes were 
made only after an individualized evaluation by the district court, the North 
Dakota Court disagreed.99 
The court concluded by holding special findings are necessary when a 
district court imposes a condition of pretrial release under North Dakota 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a)(2)(M).100  The reviewing court must be 
able “to review the district court’s reasoning to determine whether it abused 
its discretion in imposing release conditions unnecessarily restrictive to 
reasonably assure a defendant’s appearance at trial.”101  The court’s 
approach to the bail condition issue consisted of relying on authority from 
outside jurisdictions and blending that authority with existing North Dakota 
law.102  This methodology is on par with the court’s previous approach to 
issues of first impression in the State.103  In making its holding, the court 
guaranteed a condition must be supported by special findings that would 
closely resemble the probable cause finding required by the Ninth Circuit; 
unless and until the North Dakota Legislative Assembly explicitly allows 
magistrates to implement a condition of consent to warrantless searches for 
persons eligible for pretrial release.104 
 
95. Scott, 450 F.3d at 872. 
96. Hayes, ¶¶ 25-26, 31-33, 809 N.W.2d at 318-20. 
97. Id. ¶ 31, 809 N.W.2d at 319. 
98. Id. (quoting United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
99. Id. ¶ 33, 809 N.W.2d at 320 (stating no individualized evaluation was found in the 
record). 
100. Id. ¶ 26, 809 N.W.2d at 318. 
101. Id. ¶ 34, 809 N.W.2d at 320. 
102. See discussion supra Part III.A.2-3. 
103. See Butz v. World Wide, Inc., 492 N.W.2d 88, 89 (N.D. 1992) (blending authority from 
different states with prior North Dakota law that indirectly discusses the issue presented). 
104. Hayes, ¶ 26, 809 N.W.2d at 318 (citing United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 870-71, 
874 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
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B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
Initially, the court briefly outlined the background of the protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures,105 and stated the Fourth 
Amendment offers protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,106 
as does the North Dakota Constitution.107  The court remarked that, 
generally, a search warrant must be issued from a neutral and detached 
magistrate before law enforcement officers can search a person or a 
home.108  Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme Court has held 
“[w]arrantless searches inside a person’s home are presumptively 
unreasonable.”109  However, the court went on to state that North Dakota 
recognizes there are exceptions when a warrant is not needed to enter a 
home.110  One of those exceptions is consent.111 
1. Consent 
In order for consent to be valid, it must be voluntarily given.112  This 
means, “[a] district court must ‘determine whether the consent was 
voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.’”113  The court stated the 
elements to be considered when determining voluntariness are:  (1) the 
condition and characteristics of the defendant at the time of consent, and (2) 
the circumstances of the setting in which the consent was given.114 
 
105. Id. ¶ 37, 809 N.W.2d at 321. 
106. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
107. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated . . . .”). 
108. Hayes, ¶ 37, 809 N.W.2d at 321; see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 
(1990) (“The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person’s home, 
whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects.”). 
109. Hayes, ¶ 37, 809 N.W.2d at 321 (quoting State v. Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 11, 685  
N.W.2d 120, 124).  The United States Supreme Court has previously come to the same 
conclusion.  Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable.”). 
110. Hayes, ¶ 38; see also State v. Decoteau, 1999 ND 77, ¶¶ 19-20, 592 N.W.2d 579, 585 
(recognizing a “community caretaking” exception to the warrant requirement for a home entry); 
City of Fargo v. Lee, 1998 ND 126, ¶ 10, 580 N.W.2d 580, 582. (recognizing an “exigent 
circumstances” exception); State v. Nagel, 308 N.W.2d 539, 543 (N.D. 1981) (defining “exigent 
circumstances” as “an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to 
life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction 
of evidence”). 
111. Hayes, ¶ 38, 809 N.W.2d at 321. 
112. State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 116 (N.D. 1979). 
113. Hayes, ¶ 38, 809 N.W.2d at 321 (quoting State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 16, 566 
N.W.2d 410, 413). 
114. Id. (citing State v. Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 26, 685 N.W.2d 120, 127). 
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When discussing the elements listed above, the court pointed to the fact 
that a government agent testified Hayes was left with only two choices 
regarding consenting to a search of her home.115  Hayes could either 
consent to the warrantless search of her home, or she could violate her bail 
conditions which would trigger her arrest for “failing to comply with the 
district court’s order.”116  The court held under the circumstances Hayes 
was presented with, her consent was “based upon duress or coercion” and 
therefore was not voluntary.117 
The court’s “totality of the circumstances” approach to the analysis is 
in line with its previous decisions.118  And while there have not been many 
challenges relating to consent under duress in North Dakota, the approach 
taken by the court in this case seems to mirror their previous analytical 
method.119  While not cited in the court’s decision, the court’s previous 
ruling in City of Fargo v. Ellison120 appears to be most on point regarding 
consent under duress.121 
In Ellison, police arrived at an apartment dwelling after receiving a 
complaint of a loud party.122  After the defendant arrived at the door, the 
police asked for consent to enter the residence and the defendant refused.123  
The defendant later consented to the entry and search of her apartment, “but 
only after she was threatened with both arrest and handcuffing if she chose 
to exercise her constitutional right to refuse the police entry.”124  The court 
held the defendant’s consent had not been voluntarily given.125  The ruling 
in Hayes seems to reinforce the court’s earlier assertion in Ellison that 
consent given in the face of arrest amounts to consent under duress and 
cannot be considered voluntary.126 
 
115. Id. ¶ 39. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. See State v. Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶ 10, 721 N.W.2d 381, 385; State v. Mitzel, 2004 ND 
157, ¶ 13, 685 N.W.2d 120, 124 (citing United States v. Patacchi, 602 F.2d 218, 219 (9th Cir. 
1979)). 
119. See State v. Guscette, 2004 ND 71, ¶ 9, 678 N.W.2d 126, 130 (holding consent to 
search a vehicle was voluntarily given due to the fact there was “no threat or show of force” by the 
officer when he asked for consent to search). 
120. 2001 ND 175, 635 N.W.2d 151. 
121. See Ellison, ¶¶ 13-14, 635 N.W.2d at 155-56. 
122. Id. ¶ 2, 635 N.W.2d at 153. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. ¶ 14, 635 N.W.2d at 156. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
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2. Good Faith Reliance 
Having dismissed the State’s consent argument, the court next focused 
on the State’s argument that Hayes’ motion to suppress was properly denied 
because officers had relied in good faith on the bond order when conducting 
the search.127  Noting the State cited no authority that the good faith 
exception applies to a bond order,128 the court conducted a brief overview 
of the four instances in which the court has previously held the good faith 
exception inapplicable: 
(1) when the issuing magistrate was misled by false information 
intentionally or negligently given by the affiant; (2) when the 
magistrate totally abandoned her judicial role and failed to act in a 
neutral and detached manner; (3) when the warrant was based on 
an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; and (4) when 
a reasonable law enforcement officer could not rely on a facially 
deficient warrant.129 
In this case, the court referenced instances (3) and (4) when analyzing the 
bond order.130 
The court reasoned because the bond order itself provided for 
warrantless searches of Hayes’ person, vehicle, and residence, and there 
was no affidavit attached to the bond order, the order lacked indicia of 
probable cause.131  Also, the court noted, nowhere on the bond order was it 
stated the particular thing to be seized or the particular residence to be 
searched – both of which are requirements under the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.132  Given the lack of probable cause on the 
bond order, as well as its facial deficiency, the court held the good faith 
exception did not apply to the officer’s unreasonable reliance on the bond 
order.133 
The analysis completed by the court in Hayes regarding the bond order 
logically flows from prior court decisions involving the good faith 
 
127. State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 40, 809 N.W.2d 309, 321-22. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. ¶ 41, 809 N.W.2d at 322 (citing State v. Utvick, 2004 ND 36, ¶ 26, 675 N.W.2d 
387). 
130. Id. ¶ 42. 
131. Id. 
132. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.”).  The North Dakota Constitution has the same requirements.  
N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
133. Hayes, ¶¶ 42-43, 809 N.W.2d at 322. 
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exception.134  However, the application of good faith exception analysis to a 
bond order is an extension of previous North Dakota decisions that have 
followed that analysis only when discussing officer reliance on invalid 
warrants.135 
IV. IMPACT 
Deciding an issue of first impression, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
analyzed the circumstances under which a pretrial release condition can 
require warrantless searches.136  After Hayes, if a district court wishes to 
implement a pretrial release condition under Rule 46(a)(2)(M), it needs to 
issue special findings.137  What is less clear after Hayes, is what is required 
at a preliminary hearing in order to assure the pretrial release condition is 
adequately supported by special findings.138  Additionally, it is unclear 
under what circumstances, if ever, the good faith exception will apply to 
bond orders authorizing warrantless searches of a bailee’s person, vehicle, 
or home.139 
A. EXPLICIT FINDINGS:  WHAT STEPS NEED TO BE TAKEN TO 
 SATISFY THE FINDINGS REQUIREMENT? 
The court did not specify what would satisfy the new special findings 
when implementing a bail condition under Rule 46(a)(2)(M).  The court 
also did not specify what level of proof would be needed in order to support 
the assertion that a warrantless search condition would be warranted – it 
only vaguely stated that the conditions implemented should have a 
“reasonable assurance” that they will lead to the defendant’s appearance at 
trial.140  The court also asserted the ordering court’s reasoning must be able 
to be reviewed.141  Also referenced was the fact there was no evidence or 
testimony entered at Hayes’ initial appearance that related to the warrantless 
 
134. See State v. Lunde, 2008 ND 142, ¶¶ 15-19, 752 N.W.2d 630, 636-37 (holding the good 
faith exception did not apply “because the search warrant was based on an affidavit lacking in 
probable cause indicia rendering official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”); State v. 
Herrick, 1999 ND 1, ¶¶ 12-16, 588 N.W.2d 847, 849-50. 
135. See State v. Dodson, 2003 ND 187, ¶ 27, 671 N.W.2d 825, 835 (holding the good faith 
exception applied to police reliance on a warrant issued based on an affidavit that lacked probable 
cause); State v. Huges, 1999 ND 24, ¶ 8, 589 N.W.2d 912, 915 (holding the good faith exception 
applied to officer reliance on a no-knock warrant that lacked probable cause). 
136. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
137. Hayes, ¶ 26, 809 N.W.2d at 318. 
138. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
139. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
140. Hayes, ¶ 33, 809 N.W.2d at 320. 
141. Id. ¶ 34. 
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search requirement of her bail.142  This indicates in future cases where the 
government asks for a magistrate to order a pretrial release condition that is 
not specifically listed in the statute, the government will likely need to be 
prepared to enter testimony into the record regarding the relevancy of the 
condition that is being sought.143 
This could have a major impact on initial appearances in North Dakota.  
While North Dakota has a smaller population with relatively low rates of 
crime,144 these rates appear to be changing with the recent oil boom in the 
Western area of the state.145  It is yet to be seen how much stress the special 
findings requirement will put on already over burdened courts in that 
region,146 and whether that will have an effect on the frequency with which 
Rule 46(a)(2)(M) is utilized by the courts. 
B. WILL THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION APPLY TO A BOND ORDER 
 THAT HAS AN ATTACHED PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT? 
At the end of the court’s good faith exception analysis, it stated a 
“warrantless search provision in a bond order is too remote a circumstance 
to be compared to a probable cause determination resulting in a search 
warrant.”147  This sentiment is confusing given the fact it is given directly 
after the court did that exact comparison.148  The court clearly stated the 
bond order was facially deficient149 and lacking in “indicia of probable 
cause”150 – both of which are standard elements of traditional good faith 
analysis.151 
The court did analyze the good faith exception in response to the 
State’s argument the exception should apply to the bond order.152  This 
 
142. Id. ¶ 31, 809 N.W.2d at 319. 
143. Id. (“The State did not provide, nor did the district court consider, evidence or testimony 
at Hayes’ initial appearance showing a likelihood Hayes would not appear at trial without the 
imposition of the warrantless search conditions of pretrial release.”). 
144. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS:  CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES BY STATE (2010), available at http://www fbi.gov/about-us/chij/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/ 
2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl05.xls. 
145. Jennifer Joas, Report Shows Crime Numbers in Western ND, KFYR – TV (July 2, 
2012), http://www kfyrtv.com/News_Stories.asp?news=57962. 
146. CLAIRE ZILLMAN, BAKKEN BOOM CREATING CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS FOR NORTH 
DAKOTA COURTS (2012), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202568269279&sl 
return=20120908154036. 
147. Hayes, ¶ 43, 809 N.W.2d at 322. 
148. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
149. Hayes, ¶ 42, 809 N.W.2d at 322 (“The bond order also did not provide for a particular 
residence to be searched or a particular thing to be seized, as required in a search warrant by the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.”). 
150. Id. 
151. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
152. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
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seems to signify if a bond order was issued in the future, joined by a 
probable cause affidavit which was later found to be lacking, the good faith 
exception would be applicable using traditional good faith exception 
analysis.  Additionally, it should be noted that in future cases, another issue 
arising in conjunction with good faith reliance on a bond order is at what 
point the probable cause supporting the bond order would be stale.153 
C. SHOULD THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATURE AMEND 
 RULE 46(A)(2) TO ALLOW FOR A WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
 CONDITION FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE? 
Given the increased crime rates in western North Dakota,154 it may be 
time for the state legislature to discuss whether the state would benefit from 
allowing district courts to impose warrantless searches on defendants 
granted bail.  If the legislature implemented this bail condition in a manner 
that ensured it would only be used when supported by probable cause, it 
seems likely that the North Dakota Supreme Court would approve.155 
One possibility would be to tie it to defendants who are charged only 
with certain crimes – such as certain drug offenses.  North Dakota has 
already demonstrated its willingness to treat drug defendants in a 
specialized manner.156  Also, considering the recent spike in drug 
overdoses,157 and the public’s growing concern over the problem,158 this 
might be the best opportunity the state legislature will have to get this 
pretrial release condition implemented with the public’s approval.  If the 
legislature did decide to codify the warrantless search bail requirement, it 
would lessen any future uncertainty as to what burden the State would have 
when attempting to get the condition put upon defendants under Rule 
46(a)(2)(M).159 
 
153. See N.D. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1)(D) (requiring a warrant be executed within ten days of 
issuance). 
154. See discussion  supra Part IV.A. 
155. In Hayes, the court relied heavily upon United States v. Scott, which allowed for 
warrantless searches on an accused as a condition of pretrial release as long as it was supported by 
a showing of probable cause.  ¶ 19, 809 N.W.2d at 316 (citing United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 
863, 872 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
156. See supra footnote 44. 
157. Law Enforcement Agencies Hold ‘Emergency Meeting’ in GF on Deadly Synthetic Drug 
Use, WDAZ TELEVISION (June 19, 2012), http://www.wdaz.com/event/article/id/14255/. 
158. Piper Weiss, 2C-I or ‘Smiles’:  The New Killer Drug Every Parent Should Know About, 
SHINE FROM YAHOO! (Sept. 20, 2012), http://shine.yahoo.com/healthy-living/2c-smiles-killer-
drug-every-parent-know-234200299 html. 
159. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
After Hayes, any bail condition imposed under North Dakota Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 46(a)(2)(M) must be supported by special findings.160  
While the court did not strictly rule the bail condition of consenting to 
warrantless searches of a defendant’s person, vehicle, and home violated 
either the United States or North Dakota Constitutions,161 the opinion did 
express that imposing the condition was an abuse of discretion when left 
unsupported by special findings.162  The court also held consent cannot be 
voluntary when the defendant is faced with either consenting or violating 
the terms of his or her bail.163  Finally, the good faith reliance doctrine does 
not apply to facially deficient bond orders that are not supported by 
probable cause.164 
After this decision, district courts may be required to enter evidence, 
which could include testimony, in order to satisfy the special findings 
requirement needed to support any bail condition made under Rule 
46(a)(2)(M).165  Also, officers are now on notice that bond orders which are 
facially deficient under the Fourth Amendment and do not include an 
affidavit showing probable cause, cannot be relied on to execute a search.166 
Claire L. Smith* 
 
160. Hayes, ¶ 26, 809 N.W.2d at 318. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. ¶ 35, 809 N.W.2d at 321. 
163. Id. ¶ 39. 
164. Id. ¶ 42, 809 N.W.2d at 322. 
165. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
166. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
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